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This paper considers an economy using a technology that adds to a stock of pollution. 
Examples that come to mind are SO2-emissions from burning coal accumulating in the 
soil and CO2-emissions from fossil-energy use which are retained in the atmosphere. 
The stock of pollutants i subject o natural decay, albeit not necessarily of the simple 
often assumed linear type. In addition, a clean or so-called backstop technology is 
available that requires costly investments but is characterized by low variable costs 
(e.g., solar energy or wind power). The costly investments imply a slow build up of the 
capacity of the backstop. On the modelling side, this is an essential extension of most 
of the literature that considers the unrealistic case where a backstop is instantaneously 
available. The second extension the present paper makes is to consider not only the 
planning problem but also the competitive outcomes. One of the interesting results is 
that stable limit cycles may characterize the socially optimal ong-run outcome as well 
as the competitive equilibrium. Ina competitive equilibrium pollution-control p licy is 
not necessarily optimal in the sense of corresponding with the social optimum. Although 
cycling can occur in a competitive equilibrium, just as in the social optimum, relaxation 
of the control increases the set of parameter values for which complex and unstable 
behavior arises. 
Keywords: pollution, backstop, limit cycles. 
JEL classification: Q2, D6. 
1 Introduction 
This paper considers an economy using a technology which causes pollu- 
tion emissions to accumulate ( .g., SO2 accumulates in the soil, CO2 in the 
atmosphere). The pollution stock is subject o natural decay, albeit not nec- 
essarily of the simple linear type. In addition, aclean or so-called backstop 
technology is available that requires costly investment, but can be exploited 
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at low variable costs (say solar energy, wind power, etc.). The costly invest- 
ments lead to a slow build-up of the backstop capacity. On the modelling 
side, this offers an essential extension of most of the literature that con- 
siders the unrealistic ase where a backstop is instantaneously available. 
Indeed, the obvious fact that all conceivable backstop technologies ( ay 
nuclear, solar, renewables) can impossibly overtake such large markets as 
the world energy market from one day to another, is somewhat overlooked 
in the literature on backstops (for an exception, see Wirl, 1991). The fact 
that after decades of talking about backstops, substantial breakthroughs 
have been achieved recently with fuel cells adds a topical dimension to 
this investigation. Indeed, DaimlerChrysler will introduce fuel-cell buses 
this year and plans to sell fuel-cell cars in Europe and America by 2004 
(see, The Economist July 24th, 1999). This paper provides a theoretical 
analysis of the introduction of such a backstop, including a complete sta- 
bility analysis for the social optimum and a competitive equilibrium. One 
of the interesting results of this framework is that stable limit cycles may 
characterize the socially optimal long-run outcome. In addition, the paper 
investigates a competitive equilibrium if the externalities of the dirty good 
are optimally internalized or not. 
2 The Model 
The following model is a straightforward amendment of the model studied 
by Toman and Withagen (2000) to allow for a sluggish build-up of backstop 
capacities. Environmental pollution (P) or degradation ofnature increases 
by the amount of pollution emitted to the environment, which is assumed 
to be proportional to the consumption ofthe dirty product x, minus natural 
decay, A(P): 
P(t )  = x(t)  - A (P ( t ) ) ,  P(O) = Po, given. (1) 
The way the stock of pollution evolves over time can be modelled in 
several ways. It has been quite common in the early literature to assume a
constant exponential rate of decay (see, e.g., Foster, 1975). Then the rate 
of pollution decay is a linear increasing function of the pollution stock. 
This is a reasonable specification if one has in mind the decay or the 
dispersion in the environment of such substances as radioactive materi- 
als or greenhouse gases. However, this specification has been criticized by 
many authors uch as Comolli (1977), Dasgupta (1982), Pethig (1993), and 
Toman and Withagen (2000), based on the observation that high-pollution 
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levels may destroy the environment's self-purification processes. A clas- 
sical reference in the biological literature is Holling (1973). Holling gives 
several examples where the nutrient enrichment of lakes has caused new 
equilibria from which the lake cannot recover. An alternative formulation 
would then include the feature that at sufficiently high levels of pollution 
the rate of decay is reduced to zero. This is what we have in mind here. 
We choose a decay function with decay increasing initially, i.e., for small 
pollution stocks (the parabolic shape in the increasing part can be seen as 
a generalization of the linear depreciation of the standard approach), and 
with decay decreasing at larger pollution stocks (A ~ > 0 and A ~ < 0). In 
fact, decay is inverted U-shaped and concave, A ~ < 0. See Fig. 1 for a 
graphical illustration of the decay function. The familiar logistic function 
provides an arithmetical example. 
We consider a partial-equilibrium framework where consumers have 
utility U from consumption and are indifferent with respect o the origin 
of the consumer good: the dirty good x or the backstop roduct B. It is 
assumed that the instantaneous tility function U is strictly concave and 
strictly increasing and that U I(0) = oo and U 1(oc) = 0. These assumptions 
ensure an interior solution. The marginal willingness to pay, U/, describes 
the inverse demand function, i.e., the market-clearing price given aggregate 
supplies. The costs of producing the dirty good, C(x), are assumed to be 
increasing and convex in output x, C ~ > 0, C I~ > 0. Finally, existing pol- 
lution has social cost D that is strictly increasing and convex. We do not 
treat he environment as providing raw materials or anything like that. 
The extension we propose is to incorporate a backstop capacity that 
provides a clean substitute, free of variable costs and that is characterized 
by a sluggish build-up. The assumption of zero variable costs ensures that 
the installed capacity of the backstop technology isalways utilized and thus 
consumed. Consumption from the backstop can therefore be identified with 
the backstop capacity B. Of course, zero variable costs are not essential. 
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They just have to be lower than the costs of the dirty product and the 
technology itself must be economically viable. The sluggish build-up is due 
to the fact that the backstop is produced from a capital stock, say fusion or 
wind power plants, photovoltaic cells, etc., which cannot be implemented 
at once for various reasons uch as adjustment costs. Indeed, the obvious 
fact that all conceivable backstop technologies can impossibly overtake 
from one day to another such large markets as the world energy market is 
somewhat overlooked in the literature on backstops. The accumulation of
the backstop capacity is described as follows: 
[?(t) = y ( t )  - ~B( t ) ,  B(0) = 0. (2) 
Here y is the investment in the backstop and 8 is the constant rate of de- 
preciation. Investment y in the backstop technology has costs I that are 
strictly increasing and convex. 
In the following, we will study the intertemporal evolution of both states, 
backstop technology and pollution, under two different institutional ar- 
rangements: in a social optimum and in a competitive equilibrium. 
3 Social Optimum 
We start with an analysis of the social optimum. The objective is to de- 
termine optimal production of the dirty commodity and investments in the 
backstop in order to maximize the aggregate net present value of social 
welfare: 
f0 max e- r t [u (x ( t )  q- B ( t ) )  - O(P ( t ) )  - C (x ( t ) )  - I (y ( t ) ) ]  d t ,  {x(t),y(t)} 
subject o (1) and (2). The discount rate is denoted by r. 
Current social welfare consists of utility U from consumption, minus the 
external costs, D, due to existing pollution, minus the costs of producing 
the dirty good, C, and minus investment expenditures I. In this section 
we assume that the latter costs depend on production only. This does not 
exclude the (likely) possibility that production costs increase with pollu- 
tion (e.g., requiring dams, filters, and other largely fixed-costs elements), 
because these (additive) costs can be integrated in D, but it excludes that 
pollution increases the marginal costs of producing the dirty good. The 
reason for this simplification is purely arithmetical because retaining the 
pollution in the production costs complicates matters considerably, with- 
out adding further insights. To interpret the particular separability of the 
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welfare function one can assume that the function U reflects the monetary 
revenues of selling the consumer commodity on, e.g., the world market, 
whereas environmental damage D is also expressed in monetary values. 
In order to solve the optimal-control problem we define the current-value 
Hamiltonian (omitting the time argument t) 
H(x ,  y, P,  B,  X, I.Z) = U(x  + B) - D(P )  - C (x )  - l (y )  
q- Xix -- A(P)] +/ , [y  - 3B].  
Note that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in states and controls, due to 
the concave objective and given that pollution carries a negative shadow 
price )v. Therefore, the first-order conditions together with the transver- 
sality conditions are sufficient for an optimal program. The transversality 
conditions are satisfied if the states and co-states converge to a finite steady 
state or remain bounded, as in the case of limit cycles. 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are the Hamiltonian- 
maximizing conditions, 
Hx=0:  U-C '+X=0,  
Hy=0:  - I '+ / ,=0,  
and the differential equations for the shadow prices of the stock of pollution 
)v and of the backstop capacity #, given by: 
= (r + A'))v + D ' ,  
/2 = (r + 8)# - U ' .  
If we assume that interior controls exist, we can write x = X (B,)v), from 
the first necessary condition, and y = Y(/x), from the second necessary 
condition, with the derivatives, X8 = U" / ( C '~ - U ' ) ,  X~, = 1 / (C ' -  U ' ) ,  
Yu = 1 / I ' ,  given by the implicit-function theorem. In the sequel it is as- 
sumed that there exist steady states where the controls are indeed interior, 
e.g., due to the above mentioned Inada conditions. With regard to the points 
we wish to make this is not restrictive. We shall also provide some exam- 
ples where this is straightforward to establish. Substitution of the optimal 
controls into state and co-state quations yields the following canonical 
equation system: 
[J = X(B ,  L) - A (P )  , 
t3 = Y (#) -~B,  
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~. = (r + A'(P)))~ + D'(P)  , 
/2 = (r + 3)bt - U'(X(B, L) + B) .  
From this system it follows that in the steady state r + A' > 0, because the 
co-state of pollution is negative. 
We now state 
Proposition I: Suppose that in the stationary state A'(P)  > 0. Then the 
optimal steady state is asymptotically locally stable. 
The result follows from applying standard sufficiency criteria (such as de- 
veloped by Brock, Scheinkmann, and others). The formal proof is relegated 
to Appendix 1, where however other more direct echniques are employed. 
The economic onsequence of the result is that sufficient environmental 
concern, implying that pollution is below what "nature" could digest, i.e., 
P such that At(P) > 0, does not only lower stationary pollution but also 
ensures tability. However, other cases might occur as well. 
Proposition 2: If stationary pollution is "large" so that AI(P) < 0, then 
this steady state may be asymptotically ocally stable but it may also be 
unstable and, in particular, there may exist stable limit cycles. 
The existence of limit cycles means that the build-up of the backstop ca- 
pacity in order to reduce pollution and thus to lower the pressure on the 
environment, is followed by an increased consumption of the dirty product 
as the backstop capacity depreciates. Yet at higher pollution levels, the 
backstop is again pushed back into the market, and so on forever. 
The reason for the existence of limit cycles is that the framework de- 
scribed by the differential equations (1)-(2) includes one of the routes to 
limit cycles in strictly concave models addressed inWirl (1996). More pre- 
cisely, Wirl (1996) shows that growth - the derivative of a state differential 
equation with respect to the corresponding state is positive, but less than 
the rate of discount - is a pathway to obtain limit cycles. In the case at 
hand the condition of growth amounts to r > O[~/8P = -A I (P )  > O. 
Although that result is strictly speaking not applicable since we have two 
instead of the scalar control assumed in Wirl (1996), this condition extends 
apparently to multiple controls. In the case at hand the inequality is also a 
necessary condition for a Hopf bifurcation, which ensures the existence of 
stable (and generic) limit cycles. Furthermore it is worth noting that while 
Sluggish Expansion of Backstop Technologies 159 
"growth" is destabilizing, the second dynamics r > OB/OB = -8  (< 0) 
is stabilizing. Hence 8 > 0 restricts the domain of complexities even for 
A ~ < 0 up to the point of ensuring overall stability if the rate of depreciation 
is sufficiently large. Or, the other way around, long-lasting backstop (i.e., 
small 8) capacities are suitable to yield limit cycles. However, the restric- 
tion imposed by 3 is implicit rather than explicit for the social optimum. It 
is discussed in detail in Appendix 2. 
The Hopf bifurcation theorem, existence of stable limit cycles, requires 
that three properties hold: 
i. There exists a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues for a proper choice 
of the parameter that is varied (called the critical value or bifurcation 
point). 
ii. The derivative of the real part of the eigenvalues with respect to the pa- 
rameter is different from zero. Hence the critical value of the parameter 
separates the domains where the linearized system is stable (possibly 
restricted to a "stable" manifold) from the domain of locally unstable 
spirals. 
iii. The coefficient of a quadratic term of the so-called normal form is 
negative (see Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1983). 
Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure the existence of a limit cycle. Yet if con- 
dition (iii) is violated the cycle is unstable. That is, such a cycle repels all 
motions tarting arbitrarily close to the cycle (and within the stable mani- 
fold): motions tarting inside the cycle converge to the steady states, those 
starting outside the cycle either diverge or converge to another steady state 
(if existing). Stability of the cycle requires a "supercritical" bifurcation. 
The geometric intuition of the theorem is straightforward: at the point of 
the bifurcation, the steady state of the linearized system becomes acentre, 
but the nonlinear system remains table because of the negative quadratic 
terms. For parameter values slightly beyond the critical value, there are 
two opposing forces. First the negative quadratic term addressed in (iii) 
dominates the linear terms, at least sufficiently off the equilibrium. Second, 
close to the equilibrium this quadratic term is irrelevant so that the linear 
terms, with positive real parts, lead to locally "exploding" spirals near the 
equilibrium. The limit cycle arises from balancing these two forces and 
constitutes the attractor of this system. If, on the other hand, the quadratic 
term is positive, acycle requires that he linear terms provide the stabilizing 
elements o that the steady state is locally stable and the cycle becomes 
repelling. For further details ee Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983). In the 
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following we will concentrate on condition (i). We will verify the other 
conditions numerically. 
In the context of our model, the growth condition mentioned requires 
that A ~ < 0, meaning a relatively large socially optimal pollution stock. 
Given this condition, very simple examples, with high discount rates and/ 
or highly convex investment costs, allow for a Hopf bifurcation and hence 
for stable limit cycles. We consider an example with linear external costs 
D(  P ) = d P , linear production costs C (x ) = cx,  quadratic instantaneous 
utility of consumption, U(z )  = z - 89 2, so that demand is linear with 
a maximal marginal willingness to pay of 15 and maximum demand of 
1 unit, linear-quadratic investment costs I (y) = ay 4- 89 2, and logistic 
decay A(P)  = P(1 - P). For graphical purposes we choose a = 0.1, 
c = 0.2, d = 0.3, S = 0.05, and r = 1.8. Thus the average lifetime of 
a backstop lant is 20 years. We use the parameter b, which determines 
the convexity of the investment costs, as the bifurcation parameter. This 
approach leads to a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues of the Jacobian at 
b = b crit = 6.56596 .... where the derivative of the real part does not vanish 
and the bifurcation is supercritical, which was verified numerically using 
LOCBIF (see Khibnik et al., 1992). Therefore, limit cycles characterize the 
optimal policy in a local, one-sided surrounding ofb > 6.56596... In Fig. 2, 
we vary the adjustment cost parameter b as indicated for the reported Hopf 
bifurcation which yields the interesting result, that "intermediate" and high 
values induce limit cycles or instability, but low and very high values for 
b imply stability. Of course, the instability results only upon entering the 
domain P > 1/2 = argmax A(P) so that A ~ < 0. 
It could be argued that in order to obtain limit cycles an unrealistically 
high discount rate is needed. However, this barrier could be reduced by 
simultaneously reducing the rate of depreciation of the backstop technol- 
ogy 5. Moreover, although the parameters might not allow for exactly stable 
limit cycles, there might occur damped cycles which are difficult o discern 
from stable limit cycles in practice. Moreover, in practice the system will 
always be distorted by additional factors. 
Figure 2 shows the steady states in the state plane (P, B) and the asso- 
ciated stability properties for variations of the discount rate with all other 
parameters as above and b at the critical value for r = 1.8. These varia- 
tions lead to stable Hopf bifurcation too and highlight at the same time the 
nonmonotonic dependence of the steady states on the rate of the discount. 
Setting 3 = 0 and assuming I (0) = 0 implies the same steady state as 
reported in Toman and Withagen (2000). Yet the inclusion of adjustment 
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Fig. 2. Steady states, stability properties and Hopf bifurcations versus b 
costs can fundamentally alter the stability properties. More precisely, ad- 
jusnnent costs can destabilize an otherwise stable equilibrium, but cannot 
stabilize an otherwise unstable equilibrium (see Feichtinger et al., 1994). 
Therefore, considering very long lasting equipment can generate Hopf  bi- 
furcations at much lower discount rates. For example, setting a = 0.95, 
c = 0.3, d = 0.001, 3 = 0.001, and r -- 0.3 yields a Hopf  bifurcation at 
b = 132.5144 (with the steady states B = 0.457 and p = 0.517, thus y 
close to its "max imum" of 0.25). The example of the decay function used in 
the next section, A(P)  = P (1 - - ,~) ,  enlarges the critical domain, which 
simplifies the location of bifurcation, e.g., a = 0.3, c = 0.6, d = 0.001, 
= 0.001, and r = 0.2 yields stable limit cycles for b = 73.28402 around 
B = 0.29 and P = 0.516. 
4 Compet i t i ve  Equ i l ib r ia  
In this section, we study the perfect-foresight competitive quilibrium 
where the externality is either not at all internalized or not optimally in- 
ternalized by governmental environmental policy. The representative firm 
faces the following problem: 
/7 max e-rt[p(t)[x(t)  + B(t))] - C(x(t))  {x(t),y(t)} 
- -  r ( t )x ( t )  - -  I (y ( t ) ) ]  dt ,  
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subject to/) = y -&B,  B(0) = 0. So, the firm decides how much to pollute, 
x(t) ,  and how much to expand the backstop capacities, y(t),  taking the 
market price, p(t) ,  and the pollution stock, P (t), as given. The objective 
is to maximize the aggregate net present value of profits consisting of 
the revenues, p[x + B], minus the production costs, C, and investment 
costs, I, and minus the pollution taxes, rx, where r denotes the unit tax 
on the production of the dirty commodity, which is exogenous to the firm. 
Each individual firm neglects environmental damage, and pollution does 
not enter the private cost function either. Firm-specific feedback of pol- 
lution by means of the tax rate is now essential in contrast o the social 
optimum where such feedbacks were included in D. In the absence of 
such a feedback, the tragedy of the commons arises, ultimately destroying 
the environment's inherent abatement capabilities. The consequences of
such irreversibilities are analyzed by Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) in the 
context of a planning problem. The irreversibility creates a nonconcavity 
for the planning problem that would be irrelevant in our competitive setting, 
because we are working in a decentralized economy. 
The Hamiltonian of the system reads 
H(x ,  y, B, v) = p[x + B] - C(x)  - rx  - I (y) + v[y - ~B] . 
Assuming an interior solution we find as a first set of necessary conditions 
the Hamiltonian-maximizing conditions: 
Hx =p-C ' - r  =0,  
Hy = - I '  + v = 0 . 
The optimal controls, i.e., production of the dirty product and investment 
in the backstop, are now implicitly defined by x c = XC(B; r) and yC 
= yc(v). Applying the implicit-function theorem and supposing market 
clearing at any instant of time 
p(t)  = U' (x(t )  + B(t))  
yields the derivatives: 
xC8 = -U" / (U" -  C"), XCr = 1 / (U" -  C"), and yc = 1/ I " .  
Another necessary condition is the differential equation for the single 
adjoint variable of the representative firm's backstop capacity, denoted 
by v, to differentiate from the socially optimal solution where we used #: 
= (r +&)v - p .  
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Moreover, Eq. (1) describing the evolution of the stock of pollution must 
hold. Although the competitive firms have no control over the stock of 
pollution, they perfectly anticipate the evolution of pollution (rational ex- 
pectations). Therefore, the competitive quilibrium is described by the 
following system of differential equations: 
/) = YC(v) - 3B , 
ia = (r + 6)v - U'(XC(B; r) + B) ,  
/5 = XC(B; r) - A(P) .  
The following proposition identifies the relationship between acompet- 
itive equilibrium and the social optimum. 
Proposition 3: Suppose the tax rate is set such that it solves r = -)~, where 
)v is the co-state of the pollution stock in the social optimum, and satisfies 
;~ = (r § A'))~ § D ~ and a transversality condition. Then the competitive 
equilibrium is identical to the social optimum. 
Proof." Addition of this differential equation for 2 to the competitive equi- 
librium and replacing r by -;~ yields the same system as in Sect. 3 except 
for a different labelling of v instead of #. [] 
Proposition 3 leads immediately to the corollary that competitive equi- 
libria allow for limit cycles, too. Nevertheless we study in the following also 
a competitive equilibrium where internalization is possibly sub-optimal, so 
that the tax rate is not equal to the negative of the shadow price of pollution. 
Proposition 4: Suppose that the steady state is in the domain of A r > 0. 
Then the steady state is asymptotically locally stable. 
This proposition is completely analogous to Proposition 1. The next two 
propositions investigate the domain A I < 0. 
Proposition 5: Suppose that the tax rate r is constant over time. Then a 
steady state in the domain of A / < 0 is (generically) unstable, i.e., only one 
eigenvalue is negative so that the stability is restricted to a one-dimensional 
manifold of the initial conditions in the (P, B)-plane. 
The instability addressed in Proposition 5 is usually associated with multi- 
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ple equilibria with the consequence that applying even the long-run optimal 
tax is insufficient, if initial pollution is large. Note that the instability ad- 
dressed in Proposition 5 can occur in all other cases considered in this 
paper. This may be surprising to some of the readers given the strict and 
joint concavity of our model, since in the literature most of these kinds of 
instabilities are associated with (local) convexities. 
An immediate consequence of Proposition 5is that we have to extend the 
analysis o as to allow for a tax that is increasing in pollution, to get complex 
solutions. The reason is that the kind of instability addressed in Proposi- 
tion 5 excludes local instabilities of the kind required for a Hopf bifurcation. 
In a four-dimensional system of states and co-states both uniqueness of the 
optimal policy and saddlepoint stability require a stable two-dimensional 
manifold, corresponding with two eigenvalues that are either negative or 
have negative real parts. One negative igenvalue, as in the case of one 
state variable, reduces the stability to a one-dimensional manifold in the 
state space, so that the generic outcome is a local instability. Therefore, 
saddlepoint stability in this sense is equivalent to two eigenvalues being 
negative or having negative real parts. 
The relation r = r (P )  may cover to some extent not only the tax 
but also other adversities to the firm related to pollution, such as the in- 
crease of marginal costs of producing the dirty good. Substitution of this 
modification i to the above differential-equation system characterizes the 
competitive equilibrium facing a state contingent, instead of a constant or 
just time-dependent tax rate. 
Proposit ion 6: Instabilities and limit cycles can characterize a competitive 
equilibrium with a stationary pollution such that A ~ < 0. However, the 
domain for complexities in competitive equilibria is not restricted by the 
discount rate of the (representative) firm, i.e., r § A t < 0 is a possible long- 
run outcome under competition. Yet depreciation restricts the domain of 
possible complexities of limit cycles to sufficiently long-lasting capacities, 
+A t < 0, so that for ~ = 0 the entire domain A r < 0 permits complexities. 
The reason for this restriction is the stability inherent to the accumula- 
tion of the backstop capacities. In contrast to the social optimum an explicit 
bound can be given concerning the domain of complex solutions. An exam- 
ple establishing the claim of limit cycles in Proposition 6borrows from the 
social-planning example the specifications ofthe surplus, U(z )  = z - 89 2, 
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and of the investment costs, I (y) = ay 4- 89 2, but assumes quadratic 
production costs C(x) = lcx2, decay slightly different from the logistic 
one, A(P)  = P (1 - -,~/P), and firm-specific taxes/costs linear in pollution, 
r (P) = s P. A theoretical discussion and details concerning this example 
are given in the Appendix 2. Setting the parameters a = 0.1, c = 0.05, 
r = 0.3, 3 = 0.05, and s = 0.1 yields a supercritical Hopf bifurcation for 
variations in b at b = 3.870334 (i.e., a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues 
satisfying the conditions about a nonzero crossing velocity according to the 
calculations performed with LOCBIF). The resulting steady state of large 
pollution exceeds pollution feasible for a socially optimal programme and 
thus highlights that the domain of complex policies is enlarged for com- 
petitive outcomes. 
Figure 3 compares the stability properties of the competitive solution 
with the social optimum. This comparison uses the specifications and the 
parameters (a = 0.1, c = 0.05, 3 = 0.05, and s = 0.1) of the above- 
mentioned bifurcation for the competitive, intertemporal equilibrium. The 
external costs are D(P)  = dP  with d = 0.005. The figure considers vari- 
ations in the discount rate r instead of b. More precisely, Fig. 3 shows the 
steady states and the corresponding stability properties for the intertempo- 
ral, competitive equilibrium in Fig. 3a and of the social optimum in Fig. 3b 
versus the discount rate. Using the linear damage function and a suffi- 
ciently small damage parameter leads to comparable l vels of pollution. 
Although only competition i duces limit cycles while the system remains 
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Fig. 3a, b. Steady states and the associated stability properties versus the discount rate r. 
a Competition, s = 0.1, b social optimum, d = 0.005 
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saddle-point s able in the social optimum, damped oscillations are socially 
optimal over the entire considered omain of discount rates. 
5 Conc lud ing  Remarks  
It has been shown that with sluggish build-up of a backstop technology 
complex behavior of pollution and backstop capacity can arise, in a social 
optimum as well as in a competitive equilibrium. A remarkable r sult is that 
in a competitive equilibrium with nonoptimal taxation the scope for such 
behavior is larger. This fact has been established by means of a numerical 
example. Figure 4 summarizes these general findings. 
The basic reason for the occurrence of limit cycles is that the consider- 
ation of negative marginal decay introduces "growth," which is a pathway 
to Hopf bifurcation and thus for limit cycles in strictly concave dynamic 
optimization models. Local convexities substantially simplify the deriva- 
tion of limit cycles from the first-order conditions, but these conditions 
are not sufficient anymore. Wirl (1996) shows this for planning problems 
and Wirl (1997) for competitive equilibria. The reason for the differences 
between the social optimum and the competitive quilibrium is that the 
accumulation of pollution beyond the stock where r + A' = 0 is always 
socially suboptimal, but it is a feasible outcome under competition if the 
externality is insufficiently internalized. Furthermore, the relation between 
A(P) stable social optimum 
and competition 
.i . stable, lgnJt cycles, 
or unstable 
I t 
I -A  =r  
1 
[ 
optimum I \ 
. competitive . / 
" i '1 
stationary pollution P~ 
Fig. 4. Comparison ofthe stability properties ofsocial planning and competition 
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social optimum, competition, and taxation is subtle. First, a steady state of 
a competitive economy, where A I < 0 and the firms face a constant tax, is 
unstable. Hence, even a stable social optimum within the critical domain 
r > -A '  and imposing the tax equal to the long-run optimum is insuffi- 
cient for stability of the competitive economy. This result in turn implies 
that the tax must depend (positively) on the stock of pollution to allow for 
cyclical intertemporal equilibria. 
This paper has two different messages. First, growth dynamics, which 
appear to be a characteristic feature of environmental nd biological re- 
silience, allow for the puzzling feature of limit cycles as optimal strate- 
gies. In our opinion, this result, which has little intuitive appeal at first 
sight, is of considerable theoretical interest since our science (called "dis- 
mal") lacks paradoxical results. Of course, the domain where these kinds of 
strategies are indeed optimal can be rather narrow. Therefore, the second 
conclusion from this paper is more relevant for applied policy making: 
neglecting adjustment costs and thereby reduction to lower-dimensional 
systems may substantially underestimate the complexity of the optimal 
policies in environmental systems. More precisely, some kinds of oscil- 
lations (possibly damped or even more complex in higher-order systems 
coupled with growth elements, predator-prey interactions, etc.) are optimal 
for the result of competitive interactions. This was demonstrated here for 
the introduction of backstops: the apparently innocuous and highly plau- 
sible introduction of sluggish capacity expansion has not necessarily the 
smoothing effect expected to result from this modification but can lead to 
oscillations (damped, persistent, exploding). This is particularly the case 
as long as the external costs are small. 
Although our paper has introduced ynamics related to backstop tech- 
nologies, it stops half way. A major claim concerning the on-going subsi- 
dizing of backstop technologies i  that their efficiency will improve over 
time and enhances learning by doing. This leads to two opposing forces. 
Learning by doing fosters a large output of new backstop capacities, yet 
such a rapid expansion excludes the use of even more efficient equipment 
in the future providing another reason for a sluggish build up of capacities. 
How much this affects the outcome is left for future research. 
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Appendix 
1 Stability Analysis in the Social Optimum 
The stability properties of the system introduced in Sect. 3 may be studied 
applying the global asymptotic stability criteria developed in the seventies 
by Brock, Malliaris, Rockefeller, Scheinkman, and others, which are well 
summarized in the book of Brock and Malliaris (1989). However, we opt 
for a local stability analysis. This requires the calculation of the eigenvalues 
of the Jacobian J of the canonical equations ystem discussed in Sect. 3, 
evaluated at a steady state. Applying Dockner (1985), the eigenvalues Ei
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are given by 
Ei = r/2 • ~/(r/2) 2 - K/2  • (1/2)x/K 2 - 4det(J) ,  i = 1, 2, 3, 4.  
Here K is defined as follows (see Dockner, 1985, p. 96). 
K= a~b-P a~ + 3B 3U 3B 3U 
O~. 3X 3/2 3/2 +2 3X 32 
3), OB 3# 3B 3> 
The formula allows for a complete characterization f the local dynamics 
of the linearized system and provides the ideal test recommended in Brock 
and Malliaris (1989, bottom of p. 148). For the general case of Sect. 3 we 
have: 
U" 1 
-A '  0 
C" - U" C" - U" 
0 -8' 0 1/ I"  
J=  
A"X + D" 0 r + A I 0 
U"C" U" 
~ 0 C" -U"  C" -U"  r+8 
Calculation of the coefficients in Dockner's formula yields for K: 
A"X + D" C"U" 
K = -A ' [ r  + A'] - 8[r + 8] + 
C" - U" I"[C" - U"] 
The three final terms of this expression are negative, due to the assumed 
second-order derivatives and to the fact that the stationary shadow price 
of pollution, X = -D ' / ( r  + A'), is negative. Only -A ' ( r  + A') is of am- 
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biguous sign. The determinant equals: 
det(J) = ~A'[r + 8][r + A"] 
~[r + 8][XA" + D']  U'[)~A" + D" + A 'C ' [ r  + A']] 
+ 
C" - U II I"[C" -- U']  
According to the above calculations, low pollution, i.e., A / > 0, implies 
K < 0 and det(J) > 0. In view of Dockner's formula these inequalities are 
sufficient for J to have two (and only two) eigenvalues, which are either 
negative or have negative real parts. That implies saddlepoint stability, 
albeit hat damped oscillation may be optimal, since the eigenvalues of the 
stable manifold can be complex (as shown in the example in the main text). 
This proves Proposition 1. 9 
We show next that proposition 2 holds. First, A ~ < 0 still allows for 
stability. This follows directly from the above calculations because A ' < 0 
is compatible with K < 0 and det(J) > 0, which in turn are sufficient for 
saddlepoint stability. The example in Fig, 2 shows that even local mono- 
tonicity is possible for A ~ < 0. The existence of limit cycles according to 
the Hopf bifurcation theorem requires inter alia the existence of a pair of 
purely imaginary eigenvalues. Assume in Dockner's formula the existence 
of a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues, E34 = 4-iw, move r/2 to the 
left and square, 
r2/4 4- r iw -- w 2 = (r/2) 2 -- K/2  4- (1/2)~/K 2 - 4 det(J) . 
Cancelling r2/4 on both sides and equating coefficients of real 
-w  2 = -K /2  , 
and imaginary parts 
rw = ( l /2 )~g 2 - 4det( J )  , 
squaring and using w 2 = K/2  > 0 implies 
det(J) = (K/2) 2 +r2K/2 ,  K > O. 
This in mrn requires that the determinant is positive, too. 
According to the above calculation, K > 0 requires A' < 0. Ironically 
enough, this negative derivative introduces "growth," which according to 
Wirl (1996) is a pathway for limit cycles. As mentioned earlier, Wirl (1996) 
shows that growth, i.e., r > OP/OP = -A  ~ > 0, is a necessary condition 
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for Hopf bifurcation in strictly concave dynamic optimization models and 
of the possible pathways only this one is present. Although his theorem 
is, strictly speaking, not applicable because of its restriction to a single 
control, the consequence on K > 0 is tied to A' < 0. However, depreci- 
ation of the backstop capacities adds a stabilizing (i.e., negative) factor in 
K so that Ar[r + A'] must at least outweigh 8[6 + r]. Hence, long-lasting 
investments are helpful for K > 0, a prerequisite for complex solutions 
such as limit cycles. 
For the example in Sect. 3, we obtain the optimal controls, x* = 1 - B - 
c + L, y* = [Iz - a] /b.  The canonical equations (retaining A = P[1 - P] 
and A ~ = 1 - 2P as short hand) are: 
/~ = (1  - g - c + x )  - A (P ) ,  
= [# - a ] /b -  8B ,  
~. = [r + A~lL + d , 
12 = [r + 8]I~ + )~ - c ,  
which yields 
J = [ ~-A / -1  1 i / 0 -8  0 1 b -2)~ 0 r + A / 
, 0 0 1 r+S]  
This system allows for a closed-form analytical solution, of the steady states 
and even of the critical value of the bifurcation parameter, atleast for the 
parameter b.However, all these xpressions are extremely cumbersome so
that we report here only the crucial coefficient K: 
K = -A ' [ r  + A ~] + 2)~ - 8[r + 8]. 
Fairly similar are the results for the example in Sect. 4, albeit hat we could 
not obtain a closed-form solution anymore given the quadratic production 
costs: 
[~ _ 1-  B + )~ A(P )  , 
l+c  
/ ) _  / z -a  8B, 
b 
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~.= [ r+A' ] )~+d,  
/2 = [r + 3]# 
cU - B ]  - 
l+c  
This system yields the following Jacobian: 
J = 
/_A I -1 1 0 
l+c  l+c  
o -~ o l/b 
XA" 0 r + A I 0 
c 1 
0 r+8 
l+c  l+c  
The corresponding K is 
K = -A'[r + A'] 
A~)~ c 
1 +c  b[1 +c]  
3[r § 3] . 
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2 Stability in the Competitive Equilibrium 
Although the following analysis allows for taxes depending on pollution 
we start with the case where the tax rate is independent of pollution. Then 
the corresponding Jacobian equals 
J = 
-~ 1/I" I U" C" 00 r+8 
[U" - C'] 
_ _  g I! 
0 -A'  
U" - C" 
Again the stability properties can be obtained from calculating the eigen- 
values of the Jacobian. The eigenvalues are the roots of the characteristic 
polynomial: 
p(e) = e 3 - tr ( J )e 2 § ke - det(J)  , 
where k is the sum of the principal minors of dimension 2of the Jacobian. It 
plays a role similar to K in Appendix 1. The calculation of the coefficients 
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of the characteristic polynomial proceeds in several steps: 
tr( J)  = r - A ' ,  
U"A 'C"  
det(J)  = A'(~(r + (~) + 
I " (U"  - C") ' 
and 
CI Iu  '' 
k = -6 [ r  + a] - rA'  
I " [U"  - C"] 
Since A' < 0 implies det(J)  < 0, an instability arises whenever A' < 0 
and thus the impossibility of limit cycles. This verifies Proposition 5. For 
A' > 0, we have det(J)  > 0aswel lask  < 0. From det(J)  > 0 follows that 
either one eigenvalue, say e~, is positive and the other two (say e2 and e3) 
are negative, or all three are positive. Since k = e3[el + e2] + ele2, k < 0 
is only possible if both e2 and e3 are negative [because they cannot have 
opposite sign due to the fact that det(J)  > 0]. Therefore, the properties 
k < 0 and det( J)  > 0 are sufficient for saddlepoint stability. Similarly, 
det( J)  > 0 combined with tr( J)  < 0 is sufficient for saddlepoint stability. 
Therefore, the existence of complex competitive equilibria requires astate- 
contingent effect, either as a tax or through a feedback on costs. Taking 
into account r = r (P )  in the system derived in Sect. 4 and applying the 
chain rule yields the following Jacobian: 
-~  l / I "  0 j 
U"C"  -U" r '  
j=  iu , - ,  c,  ' r q- (~ UT~Ctt  m 
I I Ut' "c' 
0 -A '  + U" C rl \ U" - C" 
We now have 
and 
-g' 
t r ( J )=r -A '+ U" -C  ' ~  ' 
U ' ( r '  + A'C")  - a r ' l ' ( r  + a) 
det(J)  = A'a(r + a) + 
I " (U"  - C") 
CttU 11 rr t 
k = -(~[r + ~] - rA I + - -  
I ' [U"  - C'] U" - C" 
The existence of a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues as a necessary 
condition for a Hopf bifurcation requires that det( J)  = tr( J )k and that 
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all elements of this equation are positive. Therefore, again the sum of the 
principal minors of dimension 2 must be positive, k > 0. Again A' < 0 
is helpful for a positive trace and a positive k, but can lead to a negative 
determinant, which implies an instability, yet simultaneously excluding 
limit cycles. However, A ~ < 0 is not sufficient since k > 0 demands at 
the minimum 3 + A I < 0. The reason is similar to the social optimum: 
A I < 0 introduces growth into the externality and thus helps to destabilize 
the system while 0/?/0 B = -3  destabilizes the system. Hence instabilities 
of  any kind require that the destabilizing element outweighs the stabilizing 
element 3 + A' < 0. However, in contrast o the social optimum, low 
discount rates do not constrain the domain of feasible equilibria so that 
r + A / < 0 is feasible. 
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